When the Powerful Drag Their Feet

Paul Schure (), Francesco Passerelli () and David Scoones
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Francesco Passerelli: Università degli Studi di Teramo and Università Bocconi, https://www.unite.it/UniTE/
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesco Passarelli

No 703, Department Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Victoria

Abstract: We examine the timing of group decisions that are taken by weighted voting. Decision-making is in two stages. In the second stage, players vote on a policy restriction. In the first stage, players vote to determine the timing of the second-stage decision: “early”, before players’ types are revealed, or “late”. Players differ in both size and voting power. We show that players with greater power tend to prefer a late vote, whereas less powerful players tend to want to vote early. By contrast, large players tend to prefer an early vote and small players a late vote. We present evidence from the literatures on corporate governance, international relations, European Union governance, and oil extraction. We examine an extension in which players choose the qualified majority threshold besides the timing of the second-stage vote.

Keywords: Timing of decisions; strategic delay; committee decisions; weighted voting; multilateralism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2007-09-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: ISSN 1914-2838
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vic:vicddp:0703

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