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Multiagent System Simulations of Signal Averaging in English Auctions with Two-Dimensional Value Signals

Alan Mehlenbacher ()
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Alan Mehlenbacher: Department of Economics, University of Victoria, https://www.uvic.ca/socialsciences/economics/

No 708, Department Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Victoria

Abstract: This study uses a multiagent system to investigate English auctions with two-dimensional value signals and agents that learn a signal-averaging factor. I find that signal averaging increases nonlinearly as the common value percent increases, decreases with the number of bidders, and decreases at high common value percents when the common value signal is more uncertain. Using signal averaging, agents increase their profit when the value is more uncertain. The most obvious effect of signal averaging is on reducing the percentage of auctions won by bidders with the highest common value signal.

Keywords: Axiomatic bargaining; resource monotonicity; transferable utility; risk aversion; Agent-based computational economics; multi-dimensional value signals; English auctions; signal averaging (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C15 C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2007-11-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-gth and nep-upt
Note: ISSN 1914-2838
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vic:vicddp:0708

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