Optimal Bailouts in Banking and Sovereign Crises

Sewon Hur (), César Sosa-Padilla () and Zeynep Yom
Additional contact information
Sewon Hur: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, http://econ.sewonhur.com
César Sosa-Padilla: University of Notre Dame and NBER, https://sosapadilla.github.io

No 60, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series from Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics

Abstract: We study optimal bailout policies amidst banking and sovereign crises. Our model features sovereign borrowing with limited commitment, where domestic banks hold government debt and extend credit to the private sector. Bank capital shocks can trigger banking crises, prompting the government to consider extending guarantees over bank assets. This poses a trade-off: Larger bailouts relax financial frictions and increase output, but increase fiscal needs and default risk (creating a Ôdiabolic loopÕ). Optimal bailouts exhibit clear properties. The fraction of banking losses the bailouts cover is (i) decreasing in government debt; (ii) increasing in aggregate productivity; and (iii) increasing in the severity of banking crises. Even though bailouts mitigate the adverse effects of banking crises, the economy is ex ante better off without bailouts: Having access to bailouts lowers the cost of defaults, which in turn increases the default frequency, and reduces the levels of debt, output, and consumption.

Keywords: Bailouts; Sovereign Defaults; Banking Crises; Conditional Transfers; Sovereign-bank diabolic loop (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E62 F34 F41 G01 G15 G28 H63 H81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-opm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Bailouts in Banking and Sovereign Crises (2024)
Working Paper: Optimal Bailouts in Banking and Sovereign Crises (2022)
Working Paper: Optimal bailouts in banking and sovereign crises (2021)
Working Paper: Optimal Bailouts in Banking and Sovereign Crises (2021)
Working Paper: Optimal Bailouts in Banking and Sovereign Crises (2021)
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