Strategic Play Among Family Members When Making Long-Term Care Decisions

Steven Stern () and Bridget Hiedemann

Virginia Economics Online Papers from University of Virginia, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper describes a strategic model of bargaining within a family to determine how to care for an elderly parent. We estimate the parameters of the model using data from the National Long-Term Care Survey. We find that the parameter estimates generally make sense and that the model is consistent with the data. The results have strong implications for using less structural empirical models for policy analysis.

Keywords: Long-Term Care; Family Bargaining; Structural Estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C25 C78 J14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 1999-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (91)

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http://repec.as.virginia.edu/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap321.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic play among family members when making long-term care decisions (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vir:virpap:321

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