Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas Colell's bargaining set in economies with many commodities

Niccolò Urbinati ()
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Niccolò Urbinati: Dept. of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venice

No 7, Working Papers from Venice School of Management - Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia

Abstract: We study the Walrasian objection mechanism in the framework of economies with a measure space of agents and a separable Banach space of commodities whose positive cone has a non-empty interior. We will provide several characterizations of Walrasian objections and use them to study the bargaining set of the economy, as defined in Mas-Colell (1989). Our main result shows that whenever the measure space of agents is saturated, every non-competitive allocation can be blocked with a Walrasian objection and use this result to prove that the bargaining set, the core and the set of competitive allocations are all equivalent solution concepts.

Keywords: Walrasian objections; Bargaining set; Infinite dimensional commodity spaces; Saturation property; Lyapunov's Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2020-12
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