Constitutional conflicts in the European Union: Court packing in Poland versus the United States

Sweeney Richard J. ()
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Sweeney Richard J.: McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University,Washington D.C., USA

Economics and Business Review, 2018, vol. 4, issue 4, 3-29

Abstract: Court packing greatly threatens democracy. This paper examines, compares and draws conclusions from two attempts: The PiS government is near to packing Polish courts; President Roosevelt tried but failed to pack the U.S. Supreme Court in 1937. In most democracies a head of government with a legislative majority and strong party control can pack courts, giving complete control. The United States escaped; Roosevelt lacked complete party control. Poland is unlucky; PiS is strongly controlled. Peaceful domestic protest is necessary, but Poland’s hope is from EU-level institutional pressure, supported by major democracies, to reverse packing and prevent further seizure of power.

Keywords: Poland; constitutional law; constitutional court; constitutional rights; Supreme Court Compliance; judiciary; court packing; European Union; United States (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:ecobur:v:4:y:2018:i:4:p:3-29:n:1

DOI: 10.18559/ebr.2018.4.1

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