Hypercompetition & Fiscal Attractiveness

Rougé Jean-François and Chopov Borislav
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Rougé Jean-François: Agence Universitaire pour la Francophonie & Ecole Supérieure de la Francophonie pour l’Administration et le Management, Sofia, Bulgaria.
Chopov Borislav: Agence Universitaire pour la Francophonie & Ecole Supérieure de la Francophonie pour l’Administration et le Management, Sofia, Bulgaria.

Economics, 2016, vol. 4, issue 2, 75-93

Abstract: Hypercompetition is at the very center of modern economies. As a consequence, both states and enterprises have been heavily engaged in an amoral power game (Colonomos, 2005) based exclusively on strength where tax systems have a prominent role. An obscure fiscal war takes place firstly between states seeking to increase their attractiveness. On the other hand, firms fight against states to optimize their revenues. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to discuss the components and the implications of the competition between states expressed through the establishment of tax havens and the launch of merciless fiscal policies. At the same time, enterprises try to shape the existing laws in a manner that favors their interests, using also aggressive fiscal strategies.

Keywords: tax optimization; harmful competition; aggressive tax planning; transfer pricing; tax havens; lobbying; subventions; fiscal incentives; flat tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:econom:v:4:y:2016:i:2:p:75-93:n:7

DOI: 10.1515/eoik-2017-0007

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