Optimierung des Verhandlungsgebots auf dem Telekommunikationsmarkt

Gretschko Vitali, Axel Ockenfels and Wambach Achim

Wirtschaftsdienst, 2024, vol. 104, issue 11, 794-799

Abstract: The Federal Network Agency plans to extend the frequency usage rights of the established mobile network operators until 2030, combined with a negotiation requirement for 1&1’s access to frequencies below 1 GHz. This analysis identifies key weaknesses of the negotiation bid: lack of clarity regarding regulatory intervention in the event of a non-agreement, inefficient last-minute effects, asymmetric negotiating power and problems with the disclosure of sensitive information. As an alternative, a structured auction procedure is proposed that includes product definition by 1&1, an explicit maximum price and a “descending clock auction” to enable a more efficient and transparent award process.

JEL-codes: D44 D47 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vrs:wirtsc:v:104:y:2024:i:11:p:794-799:n:1017

DOI: 10.2478/wd-2024-0202

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