A Mechanism That Overcomes Coordination Failure Based on Gradualism, Endogeneity, and Modification
Yoshio Kamijo,
Hiroki Ozono and
Kazumi Shimizu
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Hiroki Ozono: Faculty of Law, Economic and Humanities, Kagoshima University
No 1401, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics
Abstract:
We examine three tools that can enhance coordination success in a repeated multiple choice coordination game. Gradualism means that the game starts as an easy coordination problem and moves gradually to a more difficult one. Endogeneity implies that a gradual increase in the upper limit of coordination occurs only if coordination with the Pareto superior equilibrium in a stage game is attained. Modification requires that when they fail coordination, the level of the next coordination game is adjusted to an easier one. We find from laboratory experiment that a mechanism that combines these three, termed herein the GEM, works well.
Keywords: Coordination Failure; Minimum Effort Game; Experiment; Gradualism; Endogeneity; Modification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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