Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-a-vis Cost of Betrayal

Yasushi Asako ()

No 1409, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: This study examines and models the effects of partially binding campaign platforms in a political competition. Here, a candidate who implements a policy that differs from the platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyze endogenous decisions by citizens to run for an election. In particular, the model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had di￠ culty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, even knowing that he/she will lose an election, a candidate will still run, hoping to make an opponent?s policy approach his/her own policy.

Keywords: political competition; endogenous candidates; campaign promises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises vis-à-vis Cost of Betrayal (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wap:wpaper:1409

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