Several bases of a game space and an application to the Shapley value

Koji Yokote () and Yukihiko Funaki ()
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Koji Yokote: Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University

No 1419, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: We introduce several bases of the set of TU games. Given a coalition T, Yokote et al. (2013) introduced the commander game in which a coalition including 1 player in T obtains payoff. On the other hand, Shapley (1953) introduced the unanimity game in which a coalition including all players in To btains payoff. We consider the intermediate between the two games. We introduce a game in which a coalition including k players in To btains payoff, where 1 ≤ k ≤| T |. We show that, if there is a specific relationship between the size of coalition T and k, we can construct a new basis. By using the new basis, we give sufficient conditions under which the Shapley value coincides with the prenucleolus.

Keywords: basis; Shapley value; prenucleolus; coincidence condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wap:wpaper:1419

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