 Several bases of a game space and an application to the Shapley valueKoji Yokote (sidehand@toki.waseda.jp) and
Yukihiko Funaki (funaki@waseda.jp)
No 1419, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics Abstract: We introduce several bases of the set of TU games. Given a coalition T, Yokote et al. (2013) introduced the commander game in which a coalition including 1 player in T obtains payoff. On the other hand, Shapley (1953) introduced the unanimity game in which a coalition including all players in To btains payoff. We consider the intermediate between the two games. We introduce a game in which a coalition including k players in To btains payoff, where 1 ≤ k ≤| T |. We show that, if there is a specific relationship between the size of coalition T and k, we can construct a new basis. By using the new basis, we give sufficient conditions under which the Shapley value coincides with the prenucleolus. Keywords: basis; Shapley value; prenucleolus; coincidence condition (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wap:wpaper:1419 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics Contact information at EDIRC. |
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