The Unbinding Core for Coalitional Form Games

Takaaki Abe () and Yukihiko Funaki ()
Additional contact information
Takaaki Abe: JSPS Research Fellow. Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University.

No 1805, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a new concept of core by extending the definition of deviation. The traditional definition of deviation allows for players to deviate if some profitable allocation exists after their deviation, while our new definition requires that all possible allocations are profitable. Hence, our core becomes a superset of the traditional core. We examine some properties that our new core satisfies and provide a sufficient condition for being nonempty. Moreover, we apply Ray's (1989) credibility to our core.

Keywords: cooperative game; core; credibility; deviation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2018-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.waseda.jp/fpse/winpec/assets/uploads/2014/05/No.E1805.pdf First version, (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wap:wpaper:1805

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haruko Noguchi ().