Axiomatizations of Coalition Aggregation Functions

Takaaki Abe ()
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Takaaki Abe: School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University

No 1904, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: We axiomatize Hart and Kurz's (1983) two coalition aggregation functions known as the γfunction and the δ-function. A coalition aggregation function is a mapping that assigns a partition to each coalition profile, where a coalition profile is a vector of coalitions selected by all players. Through our axiomatization results, we observe that neither the γ-function nor the δ-function satisfies monotonicity. We propose a monotonic function and axiomatically characterize it. An impossibility result on monotonicity is also provided.

Keywords: axiomatization; coalition formation; coalition structure; monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2019-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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