ON THE KUHN EQUIVALENCE OF STRATEGIES

John Hillas and Dmitriy Kvasov

No 2021, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: We show that two strategies are Kuhn equivalent if and only if they induce the same probability measure over ter- minal nodes against some profile of completely mixed behaviour strategies of the other players. This result allows us to embed the equivalence classes of strategies in the probability measures over terminal nodes for various strategy concepts. This, in turn, allows a very clean statement of the relation between the various sets of strategies in games with perfect recall, linear games, and nonlin- ear games. It also proves useful in defining and analysing solution concepts in games without perfect recall, and, in particular, in nonlinear games.

Keywords: extensive form games; perfect recall; linear games; non- linear games; Kuhn equivalence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2021-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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