Fragility of The Condorcet Jury Theorem: Information Aggregation and Preference Aggregation

Masayuki MOdora ()
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Masayuki MOdora: Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University

No 2308, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: This study considers a binary election in which imperfectly informed voters have partially conflicting interests. There is an unambiguously correct alternative in some states, while voters disagree on the better alternative in other states. The true state is unknown to anybody, but each voter receives a private signal about the state. This study identifies the circumstances in which the probability that a society utilizing the majority rule reaches the correct decisions does not converge to 1, thus showing the failure of an asymptotic Condorcet Jury Theorem. Moreover, we show that the voting behavior never reflects voters’ private information in the large elections.

Keywords: bargaining; Information aggregation; partially conflicting interests; Condorcet Jury Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2024-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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