Political Competition and Policy Choices: The Evidence From Agricultural Protection

Jan Falkowski and Alessandro Olper

No 2012-18, Working Papers from Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw

Abstract: This paper investigates whether political competition plays an important role in determining the level of agricultural protection. In order to do so, we exploit variation in political and economic data from 74 developing and developed countries for the post-war period. We use two measures of political competition: one that captures the extent to which political power can be freely contested regardless of election results and one based on vote share at last parliamentary elections. Our results, based on static and dynamic panel estimators, show unambiguously that the level of support for agriculture is the higher, the higher is the level of political competition.

Keywords: political competition; constitutional rules; agricultural distortions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 F13 O13 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-cdm and nep-pol
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http://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/inf/wyd/WP/WNE_WP84.pdf First version, 2012 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Political competition and policy choices: the evidence from agricultural protection (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:war:wpaper:2012-18

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