How to perfectly discriminate in a crowd? A theoretical model of crowdfunding

Wojciech Hardy

No 2013-16, Working Papers from Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw

Abstract: This paper proposes a theoretical framework to capture the underlying mechanisms of the innovative online crowdfunding. The goal of this work is to emphasize the advantages of crowdfunding platforms over traditional methods of sale, by describing the capabilities unique to such model and processes stemming from them. Namely, the producer’s chance for perfect discrimination is discussed, as well as the contributor’s role and his decision dilemma. Numerous extensions to the model provide additional insight into crowdfunding platforms.

Keywords: crowdfunding; strategic fundraising; innovation; Kickstarter; complete discrimination; pay what you want (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 G32 L11 L12 L15 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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http://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/inf/wyd/WP/WNE_WP101.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:war:wpaper:2013-16

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