The problem of non-optimal management of urban green areas in Warsaw

Zbigniew Szkop ()

No 2017-21, Working Papers from Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw

Abstract: In his paper the author looks at management of urban green areas in Warsaw as a principal agent problem. In the study the principal is the City Mayor, while the agent is institution responsible for managing street trees in Warsaw (ZOM). While the City Mayor is interested in enhancing the welfare of their constituency, the lower level officers do not have to be preoccupied with the same concerns - they are interested in maximizing their utility subject to some constraints imposed by their bosses. This is a standard hierarchical agency theory model. As the agent’s contract is not incentive compatible, the theoretical "residual claimancy" condition does not hold, and the species composition is different from what it would have been if the principal-agent model implemented was incentive compatible.

Keywords: Principal-agent models; urban trees; ecosystem services (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H49 Q53 Q57 R59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-env
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http://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/index.php/download_file/3862/ First version, 2017 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:war:wpaper:2017-21

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