Calibration and incentives: evidence from contract bridge

Michał Krawczyk and Maciej Wilamowski ()
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Michał Krawczyk: University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences
Maciej Wilamowski: University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences

No 2022-06, Working Papers from Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw

Abstract: We elicit probability forecasts from amateur contract bridge players. At the end of the auction of each deal in a tournament, the players were asked to make a guess (unobservable to others) about the probability with which the contract will be made. We observe them to be overall poorly calibrated. We also find that incentivizing correct forecasts makes no difference.

Keywords: overconfidence; forecast incentives; gender differences; bridge into professions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 J16 J24 L26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-spo
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https://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/download_file/1358/0 First version, 2022 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:war:wpaper:2022-06

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