An Evolutionary Approach to International Environmental Agreements with Full Participation

Hsiao-Chi Chen and Shi-Miin Liu
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Hsiao-Chi Chen: National Taipei University
Shi-Miin Liu: National Taipei University

RIEEM Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Environmental Economics and Management, Waseda University

Abstract: Under two often employed imitation mechanisms, we show that an international environmental agreement with full participation can be the unique stochastically stable equilibrium if countries' efficiency of emission reductions is high. By contrast, if the efficiency of emission reduction is low, no agreement among countries to reduce emissions will be the unique stochastically stable equilibrium. We provide the convergence rates to these two equilibria as well. In addition, it is demonstrated that the equilibria are affected by different imitation rules and model's parameters, such as marginal benefits and costs of emission reduction and the number of participating countries.

Keywords: evolutionary game; international environmental agreement; imitations; mutation; long run equilibrium; stochastically stable (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2017-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:was:dpaper:1702

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