Polluters and Abaters

Alain-Désiré Nimubona () and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné

No 1009, Working Papers from University of Waterloo, Department of Economics

Abstract: To comply with laws, regulations and social demands, polluting firms increasingly purchase the needed means from specialized suppliers. This paper an- alyzes this relatively recent phenomenon. We show how environmental regulation, the size of the output market, the elasticity of demand for abatement goods and services, and the fact that in-house and outsourced abatement expenses are substitutes or complements can influence a polluter's make-or-buy decision. Specific features of abatement outsourcing are highlighted, qualifications and refinements of the theory of vertical integration are then proposed, and some consequences for environmental policy are briefly discussed.

JEL-codes: L23 L24 Q52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2010-09, Revised 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Polluters and Abaters (2011)
Working Paper: Polluters and Abaters (2010)
Working Paper: Polluters and Abaters (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wat:wpaper:1009

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