Evolutionary Stability of Kantian Optimization

Phil Curry and John Roemer

No 1206, Working Papers from University of Waterloo, Department of Economics

Abstract: In Nash equilibrium, agents are autarchic in their optimization protocol, whereas in Kantian equilibrium, they optimize in an interdependent way. Typically, researchers into the evolution of homo economicus treat preferences as being determined by selective adaptation, but hold fixed the optimization protocol as autarchic. Here, we ask whether natural selection might choose the optimizing protocol to be either autarchic or interdependent. That is, will Kantian players, for whom the stable concept is Kantian equilibrium drive Nash players (for whom the stable concept is Nash equilibrium) to extinction, or otherwise? The answer depends upon whether players can signal their type to others.

JEL-codes: C62 C73 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2012-04, Revised 2012-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Journal Article: Evolutionary Stability of Kantian Optimization (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wat:wpaper:1206

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