Markovian Elections

Jean Guillaume Forand and John Duggan
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John Duggan: Department of Economics, University of Rochester

No 1305, Working Papers from University of Waterloo, Department of Economics

Abstract: We establish existence and continuity properties of equilibria in a model of dynamic elections with a discrete (countable) state space and general policies and preferences. We provide conditions under which there is a representative voter in each state, and we give characterization results in terms of the equilibria of an associated “representative voting game.” When the conditions for these results are not met, we provide examples that uncover new classes of dynamic political failures.

JEL-codes: C62 C73 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 67 pages
Date: 2013-10, Revised 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Markovian Elections (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wat:wpaper:1305

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