 Environmental R&D in the Presence of an Eco-IndustryAlain-Désiré Nimubona () and Hassan Benchekroun No 1406, Working Papers from University of Waterloo, Department of Economics Abstract: We compare the performance of R&D cooperation and R&D competition within the eco-industry using a model of vertical relationship between a polluting industry and the eco-industry. The polluting industry is assumed perfectly competitive and the eco-industry is a duopoly in the market for abatement goods and services, with one fi?rm acting as a Stackelberg leader and the other fi?rm as a follower. When there are full information sharing under R&D cooperation and involuntary information leakages under R&D competition, we ?find that the only case where government intervention is needed is the case where R&D cooperation yields a higher welfare but smaller pro?fits for the follower eco-industrial fi?rm than R&D competition. Furthermore, because of the market power that the eco-industry enjoys, we show that more total R&D efforts under R&D competition do not necessarily translate into more abatement activities and larger social welfare. When there are no involuntary leakages of information under R&D competition, this result occurs because R&D competition can induce more total R&D efforts than R&D cooperation even for signi?ficantly high R&D spillovers if the marginal environmental damage is large. JEL-codes: L13 O32 Q55 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wat:wpaper:1406 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working Papers from University of Waterloo, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC. |
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