Fixed Point Approaches to the Proof of the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem

Jean Guillaume Forand and Metin Uyanık

No 1706, Working Papers from University of Waterloo, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide two new proofs of the Bondareva-Shapley theorem, which states that the core of a transferable utility cooperative is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced. Both proofs exploit the fixed points of self-maps of the set of imputations, applying elementary existence arguments typically associated with noncooperative games to cooperative games.

JEL-codes: C62 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2017-11, Revised 2017-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Fixed-point approaches to the proof of the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wat:wpaper:1706

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