Competition and performance in the Hungarian second pillar

Gregorio Impavido () and Roberto Rocha

No 3876, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The performance of the Hungarian second pillar since inception has been mixed. This is partly due to a less than satisfactory support for the 1997 pension reform, conservative fund portfolio distributions, the hybrid nature of the mandatory pension fund system, the segmented nature of the market in terms of costs, and a less than aggressive commitment on the part of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority to a low-cost, transparent, and competitive equilibrium. In the accumulation phase, the authorities would need to further promote transparency and comparability of information on costs and investment performance, facilitate migration to lower cost funds, and more generally promote competition. The regulatory framework of the payout phase needs to be overhauled before the first cohort of workers retires.

Keywords: Investment and Investment Climate; Economic Theory&Research; Economic Stabilization; Financial Intermediation; Settlement of Investment Disputes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-04-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin, nep-fmk and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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