Limited access orders in the developing world:a new approach to the problems of development

Douglass North, John Joseph Wallis, Steven B. Webb and Barry Weingast ()

No 4359, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The upper-income, advanced industrial countries of the world today all have market economies with open competition, competitive multi-party democratic political systems, and a secure government monopoly over violence. Such open access orders, however, are not the only norm and equilibrium type of society. The middle and low-income developing countries today, like all countries before about 1800, can be understood as limited access orders that maintain their equilibrium in a fundamentally different way. In limited access orders, the state does not have a secure monopoly on violence, and society organizes itself to control violence among the elite factions. A common feature of limited access orders is that political elites divide up control of the economy, each getting some share of the rents. Since outbreaks of violence reduce the rents, the elite factions have incentives to be peaceable most of the time. Adequate stability of the rents and thus of the social order requires limiting access and competition-hence a social order with a fundamentally different logic than the open access order. This paper lays out such a framework and explores some of its implications for the problems of development today.

Keywords: Corporate Law; Labor Policies; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; E-Business; Disability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-pol and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (71)

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