Political alternation as a restraint on investing in influence: evidence from the post-communist transition

Branko Milanovic, Karla Hoff and Shale Horowitz

No 4747, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: The authors develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. The authors find that more frequent alternation in power is associated with the emergence of better governance in post communist countries. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms seek durable protection from the state, which implies that expected political alternation is relevant to the decision whether to invest in influence with the governing party or, alternatively, to demand institutions that apply predictable rules, with equality of treatment, regardless of the party in power.

Keywords: National Governance; Governance Indicators; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; Parliamentary Government; Emerging Markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence: Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4747

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