Contrasting future paths for an evolving global climate regime

Scott Barrett and Michael Toman ()

No 5164, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: This paper explores two different conceptions of how an emerging climate regime might evolve to strengthen incentives for more vigorous cooperation in mitigating global climate change. One is the paradigm that has figured most prominently in negotiations to this point: the establishment of targets and timetables for countries to limit their aggregate greenhouse gas emissions. The other approach consists of a variety of loosely coordinated smaller scale agreements, each one of which addresses a different aspect of the challenge, and is enforced in its own way. The primary conclusion is that an agreement of the first type may be more cost-effective, but that a system of agreements of the second type would likely sustain more abatement overall.

Keywords: Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases; Climate Change Economics; Montreal Protocol; Environmental Economics&Policies; Transport Economics Policy&Planning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5164

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