International lending, sovereign debt and joint liability: an economic theory model for amending the treaty of Lisbon

Kaushik Basu and Joseph Stiglitz

No 6555, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: As the Eurozone crisis drags on, it is evident that a part of the problem lies in the architecture of debt and its liabilities within the Eurozone and, more generally, the European Union. This paper argues that a large part of the problem can be mitigated by permitting appropriately-structured cross-country liability for sovereign debt incurred by individual nations within the European Union. In brief, the paper makes a case for amending the Treaty of Lisbon. The case is established by constructing a game-theoretic model and demonstrating that there exist self-fulfilling equilibria, which would come into existence if cross-country debt liability were permitted and which are Pareto superior to the existing outcome.

Keywords: Debt Markets; Access to Finance; Banks&Banking Reform; Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress; Economic Theory&Research (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-opm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSC ... ered/PDF/WPS6555.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:6555

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Roula I. Yazigi ().