Of Governance and Revenue: Participatory Institutions and Tax Compliance in Brazil

Michael Ryan Touchton, Brian Wampler and Tiago Carneiro Peixoto

No 8797, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: Traditionally, governments seek to mobilize tax revenues by expanding their enforcement of existing tax regimes and facilitating tax payments. However, enforcement and facilitation can be costly and produce diminishing marginal returns if citizens are unwilling to pay their taxes. This paper addresses gaps in knowledge about tax compliance, by asking a basic question: what explains why citizens and businesses comply with tax rules? To answer this question, the paper shows how the voluntary adoption of two different types of participatory governance institutions influences municipal tax collection in Brazil. Municipalities that voluntarily adopt participatory institutions collect significantly higher levels of taxes than similar municipalities without these institutions. The paper provides evidence that moves scholarship on tax compliance beyond enforcement and facilitation paradigms, while offering a better assessment of the role of local democratic institutions for government performance and tax compliance.

Keywords: Tax Law; Tax Administration; Health Care Services Industry; Public Financial Management; Public Sector Economics; Public Finance Decentralization and Poverty Reduction; Economic Adjustment and Lending; Taxation&Subsidies; Macro-Fiscal Policy; Educational Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:8797

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