Why Do Firms Pay Bribes?: Evidence on the Demand and Supply Sides of Corruption in Developing Countries

Bernard P. Gauthier, Jonathan Goyette and Wilfried Anicet Kouakou Kouame

No 9441, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: This paper empirically examines the demand and supply sides of bribery using World BankEnterprise Survey data on 18,005 firms in 75 developing countries. It assesses the determinants of firms' bribepaying behavior and examine how bribe behavior affects two main sectors where corruption is rampant: taxation andgovernment contracts. The paper shows that corruption in tax administration tends to be mainly a demand-side phenomenon.Paying a bribe requested by a public official is associated with a 16 percent increase in the share firms~^!!^ sales notreported for tax purposes. In public procurement, the results suggest, on the contrary, that corruption is asupply-side phenomenon, with bribe transactions generally initiated by firms to secure public contracts. Firmssupplying a bribe without a previous request by officials is associated with a 17 percent increase in the bribe paid tosecure a government contract, more than three times the effect observed on the demand side of bribery.

Keywords: Tax Law; Economic Adjustment and Lending; Taxation & Subsidies; Macro-Fiscal Policy; International Trade and Trade Rules; Tax Administration; Public Sector Economics; Public Finance Decentralization and Poverty Reduction; Information Technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-10-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ict and nep-iue
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Why do firms pay bribes? Evidence on the demand and supply sides of corruption in developing countries (2021)
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