Corruption in Customs

Cyril Romain Chalendard, Ana Fernandes (), Gaël Raballand () and Bob Rijkers

No 9802, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: This paper presents a new methodology to detect corruption in customs and applies it to Madagascar’s main port. Manipulation of assignment of import declarations to inspectors is identified by measuring deviations from random assignment prescribed by official rules. Deviant declarations are more at risk of tax evasion, yet less likely to be deemed fraudulent by inspectors, who also clear them faster. An intervention in which inspector assignment was delegated to a third party validates the approach, but also triggered a novel manifestation of manipulation that rejuvenated systemic corruption. Tax revenue losses associated with the corruption scheme are approximately 3 percent of total taxes collected and highly concentrated among a select few inspectors and brokers.

Keywords: International Trade and Trade Rules; Tax Law; Trade and Services; Labor Markets; Youth and Governance; Judicial System Reform; Public Sector Economics; Government Policies; Legal Products; Legal Reform; Legislation; Public Finance Decentralization and Poverty Reduction; Regulatory Regimes; Social Policy; National Governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-10-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-iue and nep-law
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http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/72692163 ... ption-in-Customs.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Corruption in Customs (2023)
Working Paper: Corruption in Customs (2023)
Working Paper: Corruption in Customs (2021)
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