“Family” ownership, tunneling and earnings management: A review of the literature

Sumon Bhaumik and Andros Gregoriou

No wp954, William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series from William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan

Abstract: In this review article, we bring together a number of aspects of family firms that are ubiquitous in a number of institutional contexts, often as part of larger business groups. We pay particular attention to the mechanisms by which families retain control over firms, and the incentives of the families in control to expropriate other stakeholders by way of tunnelling. We examine the role of earnings management in facilitating tunnelling, and evidence about the incidence of earnings management in family firms. Our review suggests that while the literature on these aspects of family control is rich, the contexts in which the empirical exercises are undertaken are relatively few, and hence there is considerable opportunity to expand it to other contexts, in particular in the form of cross-country comparisons of the relative impact of agency conflicts and institutions on these issues.

Keywords: family control; group affiliation; agency problem; tunnelling; earnings management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 2009-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: ‘FAMILY’ OWNERSHIP, TUNNELLING AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (2010)
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