Creditor Protection and Banking System Development in India

Simon Deakin, Panicos Demetriades and Gregory James (gregory.james@dmu.ac.uk)
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Simon Deakin: University of Cambridge

No 38, WEF Working Papers from ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London

Abstract: We use a new legal dataset tracking changes in creditor protection law over several decades to study the impact of legal reform on banking system development in India. Cointegration analysis is used to show that the strengthening of creditor rights in relation to the enforcement of security iterests in the 1990s and 2000s led to an increase in bank credit. We show that the change in the law was not endogenous to trends in stock market development and GDP per capita, and that the direction of causation ran from legal reform to banking development, rather than the reverse.

Keywords: creditor rights; legal origin; banking development; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cwa, nep-dev and nep-law
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Related works:
Journal Article: Creditor protection and banking system development in India (2010)
Working Paper: Creditor Protection and Banking System Development in India (2009)
Working Paper: Creditor Protection and Banking System Development in India (2008)
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