Mixing Family Business with Politics in Thailand

Masami Imai

No 2006-017, Wesleyan Economics Working Papers from Wesleyan University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper uses newly compiled data on Thai family businesses and their direct participation in politics to examine whether the political participation of family business yields private economic payoff. The paper finds that the political participation of family members is positively associated with the profitability of family businesses. Furthermore, this “political benefit” is found to be particularly large when firms are connected to the cabinet members. These results support the crony capitalism view that powerful business groups in Thailand have an incentive to directly hold influential public offices in order to influence the economic policy in their favor.

Keywords: Cronyism; Political Connection; Family Business; Thailand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G38 O53 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2006-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol, nep-sea and nep-soc
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in Asian Economic Journal (Vol. 20 No 3, 241-256) on-line at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/toc/asej/20/3 .

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wes:weswpa:2006-017

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