Value for Money? Vote-Buying and Politician Accountability in the Laboratory

Jessica Leight, Rohini Pande and Laura Ralston
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Laura Ralston: World Bank

No 2016-15, Department of Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics, Williams College

Abstract: Though vote-buying is observed in a diverse set of polities worldwide, relatively little is known about the channels through which it affects subsequent governance outcomes. Using laboratory experiments conducted in the U.S. and Kenya, we show that vote-buying reduces voters' willingness to punish politicians and increases rent-seeking by the incumbent politician. Specifically, we collect data from 816 subjects engaged in a simple voting game in which voters can punish a politician who expropriates rents from a common treasury. Voters who receive "a payment in exchange for your vote" increase the maximum amount they will allow the politician to expropriate while still voting to reelect him. Politicians, in turn, expropriate more when vote-buying is introduced. We provide evidence that social preferences, particularly reciprocity, are an important channel for this response.

Keywords: Corruption; vote buying; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48
Date: 2016-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-pol
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