Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value

Christian Trudeau and Juan Vidal-Puga

No 1705, Working Papers from University of Windsor, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce a new family of cooperative games for which there is coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value. These so-called clique games are such that players are divided into cliques, with the value created by a coalition linearly increasing with the number of agents belonging to the same clique. Agents can belong to multiple cliques, but for a pair of cliques, at most a single agent belong to their intersection. Finally, if two players do not belong to the same clique, there is at most one way to link the two players through a chain of players, with any two adjacent players in the chain belonging to a common clique. We provide multiple examples for clique games, chief among them minimum cost spanning tree problems. This allows us to obtain new correspondence results between the nucleolus and the Shapley value, as well as other cost sharing methods for the minimum cost spanning tree problem.

Keywords: nucleolus; Shapley value; clique; minimum cost spanning tree. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2017-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://web2.uwindsor.ca/economics/RePEc/wis/pdf/1705.pdf First version, 2017 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Clique games: A family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value (2020)
Working Paper: Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value (2018)
Working Paper: Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value (2018)
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