Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game

Adam Zylbersztejn ()

Department of Economics Working Papers from Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: Several experimental studies show that ex post communication mitigates opportunistic behavior in social dilemmas. The source of this effect, especially in a repeated interaction, is nonetheless still obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for two channels by which ex post communication may affect behavior in a repeated public goods game. One is related to strategic signaling. The other involves emotions induced by others' expressed disapproval. The presence of ex post communication strongly fosters pro-social behavior. The data do not support the signaling hypothesis, favouring the emotion-based explanation instead.

Keywords: Public goods game; Voluntary Contribution Mechanism; Ex post communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-sog
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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game (2014)
Working Paper: Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game (2013)
Working Paper: Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game (2013)
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