Making Bureaucracy Work: Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China

Junyan Jiang

American Journal of Political Science, 2018, vol. 62, issue 4, 982-999

Abstract: Patron–client networks are widely found in governments of transitional societies and are often seen as an impediment to effective governance. This article advances an alternative view that emphasizes their enabling effects. I argue that patron–client relations can be used to improve government performance by resolving principal–agent problems within political hierarchies. I substantiate this claim by examining how patronage networks shape economic performance of local governments in China. Using an original city–level panel data set between 2000 and 2011, and a new method that identifies patronage ties based on past promotions, I show that city leaders with informal ties to the incumbent provincial leaders deliver significantly faster economic growth than those without. I conduct additional analyses to rule out several important alternative explanations and provide evidence on the incentive‐enhancing mechanism. These findings highlight the importance of informal institutions for bureaucratic management and authoritarian governance.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (58)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12394

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:62:y:2018:i:4:p:982-999

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in American Journal of Political Science from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().