Political Influence and Career Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Administrative Review by the Spanish Supreme Court

Nuno Garoupa, Marian Gili and Fernando Gómez‐Pomar

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2012, vol. 9, issue 4, 795-826

Abstract: This article develops an empirical analysis of judicial behavior in the Spanish Supreme Court, a court of law dominated by career judiciary. We focus on administrative review. The evidence seems to confirm that a career judiciary is not strongly politically aligned and favors consensus, formalism, and dissent avoidance. Notwithstanding, we detect a significant relationship between the decisions of the Court and the interest of the government. We suggest that our empirical analysis makes a significant contribution to undermine the myth of political insulation by career judges. Unlike previous literature, however, we argue and illustrate that judicial politicization can be consistent with consensus and dissent avoidance.

Date: 2012
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2012.01270.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:empleg:v:9:y:2012:i:4:p:795-826

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