The Trade‐Off between Insurance and Incentives in Differentiated Unemployment Policies

Johannes Spinnewijn

Fiscal Studies, 2020, vol. 41, issue 1, 101-127

Abstract: In this paper, I revisit the central trade‐off between insurance and incentives in the design of unemployment insurance policies. The generosity of unemployment insurance benefits differs not only across countries, but also across workers within countries. After illustrating some important dimensions of heterogeneity in a cross‐country analysis, I extend the standard Baily–Chetty formula to identify the key empirical moments and elasticities required to evaluate the differentiated unemployment policy within a country. I also review some prior work and aim to provide guidance for future work trying to inform the design of unemployment policies.

Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-5890.12199

Related works:
Working Paper: The trade-off between insurance and incentives in differentiated unemployment policies (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:fistud:v:41:y:2020:i:1:p:101-127

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Fiscal Studies from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().