The effects of false identification laws on underage alcohol‐related traffic fatalities

Erik Nesson and Vinish Shrestha

Health Economics, 2021, vol. 30, issue 9, 2264-2283

Abstract: We examine the effects of policies aimed at restricting the use of false identification to purchase alcohol on traffic fatalities involving alcohol‐impaired underage drivers. We find that the implementation of policies that incentivize alcohol retailers to adopt ID scanners reduces traffic fatalities from accidents involving 16–18 year old drivers with a BAC >0, but we do not find that similar policies like vertical ID laws lead to statistically significant changes in traffic fatalities involving underage impaired drivers. A back‐of‐the‐envelope calculation suggests that if all remaining states passed ID scanner laws, the reduction in underage alcohol‐related fatal accidents would generate over $400 million in annual economic benefits.

Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4376

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:30:y:2021:i:9:p:2264-2283

Access Statistics for this article

Health Economics is currently edited by Alan Maynard, John Hutton and Andrew Jones

More articles in Health Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().