PLATFORM COMPETITION WITH ENDOGENOUS HOMING

Thomas Jeitschko and Mark Tremblay

International Economic Review, 2020, vol. 61, issue 3, 1281-1305

Abstract: We consider two‐sided markets in which consumers and firms endogenously determine whether they single‐home, multi‐home, or exit the market. We find that the competitive bottleneck allocation in which consumers single‐home and firms multi‐home is always an equilibrium. In addition, we find equilibria with multi‐homing and single‐homing on each side of the market. However, unlike the standard pricing result where the side that multi‐homes faces higher prices, we find that lower prices coincide with multi‐homing: agents find multi‐homing more attractive when faced with lower prices. We also show that endogenous homing can induce straddle pricing which deters price undercutting between platforms.

Date: 2020
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