Do Central Bank Forecasts Influence Private Agents? Forecasting Performance versus Signals

Paul Hubert

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2015, vol. 47, issue 4, 771-789

Abstract: Focusing on a set of central banks that publish inflation forecasts in real time, this paper aims to establish whether central bank inflation forecasts influence private inflation forecasts. The response is positive in the five countries studied: Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, and Japan. Three hypotheses may explain this central bank influence: central bank forecasts are more accurate than private ones, are based on different information sets, and/or convey signals about future policy decisions and policymakers’ preferences and objectives. We provide evidence that the source of these central banks’ influence is not linked to their forecasting performance.

Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (65)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12227

Related works:
Working Paper: Do central banks forecast influence private agents ? Forecasting performance vs. signals (2011)
Working Paper: Informational Advantage and Influence of Communicating Central Banks (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:47:y:2015:i:4:p:771-789

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking is currently edited by Robert deYoung, Paul Evans, Pok-Sang Lam and Kenneth D. West

More articles in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking from Blackwell Publishing
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().