Political and public acceptability of congestion pricing: Ideology and self-interest

Björn Hårsman and John Quigley
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Björn Hårsman: Dean Emeritus and Professor of Economics, Royal Institute of Technology, Postal: Dean Emeritus and Professor of Economics, Royal Institute of Technology

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2010, vol. 29, issue 4, 854-874

Abstract: Studies of the “stated preferences” of households generally report public and political opposition by urban commuters to congestion pricing. It is thought that this opposition inhibits or precludes tolls and pricing systems that would enhance efficiency in the use of scarce roadways. This paper analyzes the only case in which road pricing was decided by a citizen referendum on the basis of experience with a specific pricing system. The city of Stockholm introduced a toll system for seven months in 2006, after which citizens voted on its permanent adoption. We match precinct voting records to resident commute times and costs by traffic zone, and we analyze patterns of voting in response to economic and political incentives. We document political and ideological incentives for citizen choice, but we also find that the pattern of time savings and incremental costs exerts a powerful influence on voting behavior. In this instance, at least, citizen voters behave as if they value commute time highly. When they have experienced first-hand the out-of-pocket costs and time savings of a specific pricing scheme, they are prepared to adopt freely policies that reduce congestion on urban motorways. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

Date: 2010
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Related works:
Working Paper: Political and Public Acceptability of Congestion Pricing: Ideology and Self Interest (2011)
Working Paper: Political and Public Acceptability of Congestion Pricing: Ideology and Self Interest (2010)
Working Paper: Political and Public Acceptability of Congestion Pricing: Ideology and Self Interest (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:29:y:2010:i:4:p:854-874

DOI: 10.1002/pam.20529

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