Altruism, agency, and the competitiveness of family firms

William S. Schulze, Michael H. Lubatkin and Richard N. Dino
Additional contact information
William S. Schulze: Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, 10900 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44106-7235, USA, Postal: Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, 10900 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44106-7235, USA
Michael H. Lubatkin: Department of Management, School of Business Administration, University of Connecticut & EM Lyon, 2100 Hillside Road, Unit 2041 MG, Storrs, CT. 06269-2041, USA, Postal: Department of Management, School of Business Administration, University of Connecticut & EM Lyon, 2100 Hillside Road, Unit 2041 MG, Storrs, CT. 06269-2041, USA
Richard N. Dino: Department of Management, School of Business Administration, University of Connecticut 2100 Hillside Road, Unit 2041 D, Storrs, CT 06269-2041, USA, Postal: Department of Management, School of Business Administration, University of Connecticut 2100 Hillside Road, Unit 2041 D, Storrs, CT 06269-2041, USA

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2002, vol. 23, issue 4-5, 247-259

Abstract: The core belief among agency theorists is that when a firm is both owned and managed by family members, its governance structure is efficient. We argue that this belief over-simplifies the complexity of exchanges that occur among the family firm's decision agents, and does not conform to reality. We develop an alternative agency view of family firm governance that accounts for agency problems that are understated in extant agency models. These problems are rooted in the firm's ownership structure, as well as the altruistic relationships that exist between the firm's decision agents. We conclude with four propositions that address the competitive implications of this alternative view. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (97)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1064 Link to full text; subscription required (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:247-259

DOI: 10.1002/mde.1064

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().