Information sharing in a Cournot–Bertrand duopoly

Michael Kopel and Eva Maria Putz

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2021, vol. 42, issue 7, 1645-1655

Abstract: Studies on information sharing in oligopolies focus on either Cournot or Bertrand markets. We consider a Cournot–Bertrand market where owners provide strategic managerial incentives and can share the details of their compensation contracts. We find that the Cournot firm punishes its manager for sales, whereas the Bertrand firm rewards sales. Both firms share contract information if the firms' products are sufficiently differentiated. However, if product differentiation is low, then either the Cournot firm or the Bertrand firm keeps the contract information private. Mandating information sharing can lead to an increase in consumer and social welfare but harms firms' profits.

Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3348

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:42:y:2021:i:7:p:1645-1655

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().