Online channel introduction under contract negotiation: Reselling versus agency selling

Chongping Chen, Xiaopo Zhuo and Yanshan Li

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 1, 146-158

Abstract: This study investigates manufacturers' online channel introduction strategies by considering two typical retailing formats, namely, reselling and agency selling. Online spillover effect and contract negotiation are considered to make the model more consistent with practice. We find that with a strong bargaining power, the manufacturer will always be profitable when it introduces online channels, whether it is reselling or agency selling. Meanwhile, agency selling is always profitable for the manufacturer than reselling. Interestingly, we find that an incentive alignment exists when two online channels are introduced, where agency selling is profitable for both the manufacturer and the e‐commerce platforms (EPs).

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3364

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:1:p:146-158

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().