Do firms with foreign residency rights controlling shareholders reduce R&D investment?

Baoyin Qiu, Bo Cheng, Hangeng Qiu and Kam C. Chan

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2022, vol. 43, issue 5, 1403-1422

Abstract: We investigate the impact of the foreign residency rights of controlling shareholders (foreign residency rights, or FRRs) on their firms' research and development (R&D) investment. The results are robust using a propensity score matching model and alternative metrics of FRRs and R&D investment. The findings suggest that firms with FRR controlling shareholders engage in less R&D investment than those without FRR controlling shareholders. Additional analysis indicates that high institutional investor ownership and a high‐quality internal control can restrain the adverse impact of FRRs on a firm's R&D investment.

Date: 2022
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3462

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:5:p:1403-1422

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